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Abstract. Recommendation systems are information-ﬁltering systems
that help users deal with information overload. Unfortunately, current
recommendation systems prompt serious privacy concerns. In this work,
we propose an architecture that protects user privacy in such
collaborative-ﬁltering systems, in which users are proﬁled on the ba-
sis of their ratings. Our approach capitalizes on the combination of two
perturbative techniques, namely the forgery and the suppression of rat-
ings. In our scenario, users rate those items they have an opinion on.
However, in order to avoid privacy risks, they may want to refrain from
rating some of those items, and/or rate some items that do not reﬂect
their actual preferences. On the other hand, forgery and suppression may
degrade the quality of the recommendation system. Motivated by this,
we describe the implementation details of the proposed architecture and
present a formulation of the optimal trade-oﬀ among privacy, forgery
rate and suppression rate. Finally, we provide a numerical example that
illustrates our formulation.
1 Introduction
From the advent of the Internet and the World Wide Web (WWW), the amount
of information available to users has grown exponentially. Today, due to this
information overload, users feel they have to separate the wheat from the chaﬀ.
Recommendation systems are a type of information-ﬁltering systems that as-
sist users in this task by suggesting information items they may be interested
in. Among the existing recommendation systems, some of the most successful
ones are based on collaborative ﬁltering (CF) algorithms [1, 2]. Examples of
CF-based systems include recommending books, music, and other products at
Amazon.com [3], movies by MovieLens [4] and Netﬂix [5], and news at Digg [6].
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One of themost popular forms of interaction in recommendation systems is that
users communicate their preferences by rating items. This is the case of Movielens,
where users assign ratings to movies they have already watched. Other strate-
gies to capture users’ interests include asking them to sort a number of items by
order of predilection, or suggesting that they mark the items they like. On the
other hand, recommendation systems may collect data from users without requir-
ing them to explicitly convey their interests [7]. Such practices include observing
the items clicked by users in an online store, analyzing the time it takes users to
examine an item, or simply keeping a record of the purchased items.
The prolonged collection of these data allows the system to extract an accurate
snapshot of user interests or user proﬁles. Once this information has been cap-
tured, the recommendation system applies an algorithm that returns a prediction
of users’ interests for those items they havenot yet considered.For example,Movie-
lens and Digg apply CF algorithms to predict the rating that a user would give to a
movie and to create a personalized list of recommended news, respectively. Fig. 1
illustrates the case of Movielens and provides an example of user proﬁle.
Despite the many advantages recommendation systems are bringing to users,
the information collected, processed and stored by these systems prompts serious
privacy concerns. One of the main privacy risks perceived by users is that of a
computer “ﬁguring things out” about them [8]. Namely, many users are worried
about the idea that their proﬁles may reveal sensitive information such as health-
related issues, political aﬃliation, salary or religion. On the other hand, other
users are concerned that the system’s predictions may be totally erroneous and
be later used to defame them. The latter situation is illustrated in [9], where the
accuracy of the predictions provided by TiVo digital video recorder and Amazon
is questioned. Speciﬁcally, the author describes several real cases in which the
recommender makes dubious, and in some cases aberrant, inferences about users’
sexual preferences. Lastly, other privacy risks embrace unsolicited marketing,
information leaked to other users of the same computer, court subpoenas, and
government surveillance [8].
Therefore, it is not surprising that some users are reticent to disclose their
interests. In fact, [10] reports that the 24% of Internet users surveyed provided
false information in order to avoid giving private information to a Web site.
In this line, another study [11] ﬁnds that 95% of the respondents refused, at
some point, to provide personal information when requested by a Web site. In
a nutshell, these studies seem to indicate that submitting false information and
refusing to give private information are strategies accepted by users concerned
with their privacy.
1.1 Contribution and Plan of This Paper
In this work, we tackle the problem of protecting user proﬁles in recommendation
systems based on CF algorithms. Speciﬁcally, we propose an architecture aimed
at preserving user privacy in those systems in which users are proﬁled on the basis
of their ratings. Our approach relies upon the combination of two conceptually
simple mechanisms: forgery and suppression of ratings. More accurately, in our
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Fig. 1. The proﬁle of a user is modeled in Movielens as a histogram of absolute fre-
quencies of ratings within a set of movie genres (bottom). Based on this proﬁle, the
recommender predicts the rating that the user would probably give to a movie (top).
After having watched the movie, the user rates it and their proﬁle is updated.
scenario, users rate those items they have an opinion on. However, in order
to prevent privacy risks, they may wish to refrain from rating some of those
items, and/or rate items that are unknown to them and do not reﬂect their
actual preferences. In order to hinder privacy attackers in their eﬀorts to proﬁle
users’ interests, the proposed architecture helps users decide which items should
be rated and which should not. Consequently, this approach guarantees user
privacy to a certain extent, without having to trust the recommendation system
or the network operator, but at the cost a loss in utility, namely a degradation in
the accuracy of the prediction. Our approach contemplates the impact that the
forgery and suppression of ratings have on the quality of the recommendation,
but tackles this in a more simpliﬁed manner, by using of a tractable measure of
utility, in the absence of a future, more elaborated study.
In addition, we present an information-theoretic, mathematical formulation of
the trade-oﬀ among privacy, forgery rate and suppression rate. More speciﬁcally,
in this formulation we measure privacy as the entropy of the user’s apparent
proﬁle, which is the proﬁle observed by the system, after the forgery and sup-
pression of ratings. Our formulation results in a convex optimization problem
for which there exist eﬃcient numerical methods to solve it. Finally, we would
like to add that our approach could beneﬁt from the combination with other
alternatives in the literature.
Sec. 2 reviews some relevant approaches aimed at preserving user privacy in
CF-based recommendation systems. Sec. 3 describes a privacy-protecting archi-
tecture based on the forgery and suppression of ratings. In addition, this section
A Privacy-Protecting Architecture for Collaborative Filtering 45
presents the model of user proﬁle assumed, the adversarial model and our pri-
vacy measure. Sec. 4 introduces a formulation of the trade-oﬀ among privacy,
forgery rate and suppression rate. Sec. 5 shows a simple but insightful example
that illustrates this formulation. Conclusions are drawn in Sec. 6.
2 State of the Art
Numerous approaches have been proposed to protect user privacy in the context
of recommendation systems using CF techniques. These approaches basically
suggest three main strategies: perturbing the information provided by users,
using cryptographic techniques, and distributing the information stored by rec-
ommenders.
In the case of perturbative methods for recommendation systems, [12] pro-
poses that users add random values to their ratings and then submit these per-
turbed ratings to the recommender. After receiving these ratings, the system
executes an algorithm and sends the users some information that allows them to
compute the prediction. When the number of participating users is suﬃciently
large, the authors ﬁnd that user privacy is protected to a certain extent and the
system reaches a decent level of accuracy. However, even though a user disguises
all their ratings, it is evident that the items themselves may uncover sensitive
information. In other words, the simple fact of showing interest in a certain item
may be more revealing than the ratings assigned to that item. For instance, a
user rating a book called “How to Overcome Depression” indicates a clear inter-
est in depression, regardless of the score assigned to this book. Apart from this
critique, other works [13, 14] stress that the use of randomized data distortion
techniques might not able to preserve privacy.
In line with this work, [15] applies the same perturbative technique to CF
algorithms based on singular-value decomposition (SVD). More speciﬁcally, the
authors focus on the impact that their technique has on privacy. For this pur-
pose, they use the privacy metric proposed by [16], which is essentially equiva-
lent to diﬀerential entropy, and conduct some experiments with data sets from
Movielens and Jester [17]. The results show the trade-oﬀ curve between accu-
racy in recommendations and privacy. In particular, they measure accuracy as
the mean absolute error between the predicted values from the original ratings
and the predictions obtained from the perturbed ratings.
At this point, we would like to remark that the use of perturbative techniques
is by no means new in other application scenarios such as private information
retrieval (PIR). In this scenario, users send general-purpose queries to an infor-
mation service provider. An example would be a user sending the query:“What
was George Orwell’s real name?”. A perturbative approach to protect user pro-
ﬁles in this context consists in combining genuine with false queries. In this sense,
[18] proposes a non-randomized method for query forgery and investigates the
trade-oﬀ between privacy and the additional traﬃc overhead. Naturally, the per-
turbation of user proﬁles for privacy protection may be carried out not only by
means of insertion of bogus activity, but also by suppression. This is exactly the
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alternative proposed in [19], aimed at protecting user privacy in the scenario of
the semantic Web. More accurately, this approach recommends that users refrain
from tagging some resources when their privacy is being compromised.
Regarding the use of cryptographic techniques, [20, 21] propose a method
that enables a community of users to calculate a public aggregate of their pro-
ﬁles without revealing them on an individual basis. In particular, the authors
use a homomorphic encryption scheme and a peer-to-peer (P2P) communication
protocol for the recommender to perform this calculation. Once the aggregated
proﬁle is computed, the system sends it to users, who ﬁnally use local com-
putation to obtain personalized recommendations. This proposal prevents the
system or any external attacker from ascertaining the individual user proﬁles.
However, its main handicap is assuming that an acceptable number of users is
online and willing to participate in the protocol. In line with this, [22] uses a
variant of Pailliers’ homomorphic cryptosystem which improves the eﬃciency in
the communication protocol. Another solution [23] presents an algorithm aimed
at providing more eﬃciency by using the scalar product protocol.
In order to mitigate the potential privacy risks derived from the fact that
users’ private information is kept in a single repository, some approaches sug-
gest that this information be stored in a distributed way. This is the case of [24],
which presents a CF algorithm called PocketLens, speciﬁcally designed to be
deployed to a P2P scenario. The algorithm in question enables users to decide
which private information should exchange with other users of the P2P commu-
nity. In addition, the authors provide several architectures for the problem of
locating neighbors. Another alternative assumes a pure decentralized P2P sce-
nario and proposes the use of several perturbative strategies [25]. In essence,
this scheme could be regarded as a combination of the approaches in [24] and
[12]. Namely, the mentioned scheme recommends replacing the actual ratings by
ﬁxed, predeﬁned values, by uniformly distributed random values, and by a bell-
curve distribution imitating the distribution of the population’s ratings.
3 An Architecture for Privacy Protection in CF-Based
Recommendation Systems
In this section, we present the main contribution of this work: an architecture
for the protection of user proﬁles in recommendation systems relying on CF
algorithms. Speciﬁcally, we consider the case in which users’ preferences are
exclusively derived from the ratings they assign to items. Bearing this in mind,
we shall hereafter refer to the user’s known items as those items they have an
opinion on. In the case of Movielens, for example, the known items of a particular
user would be those movies the user has already watched. Analogously, we shall
refer to the user’s unknown items as those items the user is not in the position
to rate. For instance, this could be the case of a movie the user is not aware of
or a movie the user has heard about, but has not watched yet.
Our approach is based on the combined use of two perturbative techniques,
namely the submission of ratings of unknown items and the suppression of rat-
ings of known items. For the sake of brevity, we shall occasionally refer to these
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techniques simply as the forgery and suppression of ratings, respectively. Accord-
ing to these mechanisms, in our scenario users rate known items. However, in
order to avoid privacy risks, they may want to refrain from rating some of those
known items, and/or rate some unknown items. Having said this, we would like
to mention that the fact that forgery only applies to unknown items is basically
because users may be reluctant to assign false ratings to known items. Despite
the above, our approach could also give the user the option to forge ratings of
known items. However, for brevity, we only describe the case where forgery ap-
plies just to unknown items. Lastly, we would like to say that our approach could
be integrated with other systems, like for example, with some of the approaches
mentioned in Sec. 2, and those using pseudonyms [26, 27].
In the rest of this section, we provide further insight into our proposal. Con-
cretely, we propose a mathematical model of user proﬁles in Sec. 3.1. Afterwards,
Sec. 3.2 examines the assumed adversarial model. Next, our privacy criterion is
presented and justiﬁed in Sec. 3.3. Lastly, we delve into our architecture and
analyze each of its internal components in Sec. 3.4.
3.1 User Profile
We pointed out in Sec. 1 that Movielens uses histograms of absolute frequen-
cies to show user proﬁles. Other systems such Jinni and Last.fm represent this
information by means of a tag cloud, which may be regarded as another kind
of histogram. In this spirit, recent privacy-protecting approaches in the sce-
nario of recommendation systems propose using histograms of absolute frequen-
cies [28, 29].
According to all these examples, and as used in [30, 19, 18], we propose a
tractable model of user proﬁle as a probability mass function (PMF), that is, a
histogram of relative frequencies of ratings within a predeﬁned set of categories
of interest. We would like to remark that, under this model, user proﬁles do not
capture the particular scores given to items, but what we consider to be more
sensitive: the categories these items belong to. This corresponds to the case of
Movielens, which we illustrate in Fig. 1. In this example, a user assigns two
stars to a movie, meaning that they consider it to be “fairly bad”. However,
the recommender updates their proﬁle based only on the categories this movie
belongs to.
Having assumed the above model, now we focus on how to estimate the proﬁle
of a user from their ratings. The reason is that our approach requires this infor-
mation to help users decide which items should be rated and which should not.
Clearly, the easiest way to obtain a user proﬁle is by asking the recommender.
Movielens users, for instance, can do that. Unfortunately, in most recommenda-
tion systems users do not have access to this information. In order to cope with
this, we suggest an alternative for extracting users’ preferences from their rating
activity.
We consider two possible cases for the information that a system shows about
its items. The trivial case is when the recommender provides users with a cat-
egorization of all of its items. In this situation, it is straightforward to keep a
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histogram based on these categories. This is the case of Netﬂix or Movielens,
where the genres of all movies are available to users. On the contrary, it may
happen that this categorization is not at the disposal of users. This applies to
Digg, where the only information that the recommender provides about news is
the headline, the ﬁrst lines of the news and the source of information. In sys-
tems like this, the categorization of items may be accomplished by exploring web
pages with information about those items. Speciﬁcally, this process could be car-
ried out by using the vector space model [31], as normally done in information
retrieval, to represent these web pages as tuples containing their most represen-
tative terms. Namely, the term frequency-inverse document frequency (TF-IDF)
could be applied to calculate the weights of each term appearing in a web page.
Next, the most weighted terms of each web page could be combined in order
to create a category and assign it to the item. After obtaining the categories
associated with all the items rated by a user, their proﬁle would be computed
as a histogram across these categories.
3.2 Adversarial Model
In our scenario, we suppose users interact with recommendation systems that
infer their preferences based only on their ratings. This supposition is reinforced
by the tractability of the model considered and also by the fact that implicit
mechanisms are often less accurate than explicit ratings [32].
Under this assumption, we consider an adversarial model in which users sub-
mitting their ratings are observed by a passive attacker who is able to ascertain
which ratings are associated with which items. Concretely, this could be the case
of the recommendation system itself or, in general, any privacy attacker able to
crawl through this information.
Bearing in mind the model of user proﬁle assumed in Sec. 3.1, after the rating
of a suﬃciently large number of items, the attacker can compute a histogram
with the actual interests of a particular user. However, when this user adheres to
the forgery and suppression of ratings, the attacker observes a perturbed version
of this histogram, which makes it more diﬃcult for the attacker to discover the
user’s actual preferences. We shall refer to this perturbed proﬁle as the user’s
apparent proﬁle.
3.3 Privacy Metric
Any optimized mechanism aimed at protecting the privacy of users necessarily
requires to evaluate the extent to which it is eﬀective. In this work, just as
in [19,18], we use an information-theoretic quantity to emphasize that an attacker
will have gained some information about a user whenever their preferences are
biased towards certain categories of interest.
Speciﬁcally, we measure privacy as the Shannon entropy [33] of the user’s ap-
parent distribution. Recall that the entropy is formulated in the following terms.
Consider a random variable (r.v.) distributed according to a PMF t and taking
on values in the alphabet {1, . . . , n}. The entropy of this probability distribution
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is deﬁned as H(t) =
∑n
i=1 ti log2 ti, which may be interpreted as a measure of
the uncertainty of the outcome of that random variable, and also regarded as a
special case of Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence [34]. An interesting property of
the entropy is that it is maximized, among all distributions on that alphabet, by
the uniform distribution ui = 1/n for all i. This allows us to capture the intuitive
observation that an attacker will have compromised user privacy as long as the
user’s apparent proﬁle diverges from the uniform proﬁle.
Having deﬁned our measure of privacy, later in Sec. 4 we formulate the op-
timization problem given by the maximization of the entropy of the user’s ap-
parent distribution for a given forgery rate and a suppression rate. Precisely,
our privacy criterion is justiﬁed by the rationale behind entropy maximization
methods [35, 36]. Namely, some of the arguments in favor of these methods are
related to the highest number of permutations with repeated elements associated
with an empirical distribution [35], or more generally, the method of types and
large deviation theory [34, §11].
In addition, we would like to stress that, although our privacy criterion is
based on a fundamental quantity in information theory, the convergence of these
two ﬁelds is by no means new. In fact, Shannon’s work in the ﬁfties introduced
the concept of equivocation as the conditional entropy of a private message given
an observed cryptogram [37], later used in the formulation of the problem of
the wiretap channel [38, 39] as a measure of conﬁdentiality. In addition, recent
studies [40,41] reassert the suitability and applicability of the concept of entropy
as a measure of privacy.
3.4 Architecture
In this section, we describe an architecture that helps users decide which un-
known items should be rated and which known items should not in order to
hinder privacy attackers in their eﬀorts to proﬁle users’ interests. Our architec-
ture is conceived to be implemented by a software application running on the
user’s local machine. Fig. 2 shows the proposed architecture, which consists of a
number of modules, each of them performing a speciﬁc task. Next, we provide a
functional description of all of its modules and examine the details of a practical
implementation.
Communication Manager. This module is in charge of interacting with the
recommendation system. Speciﬁcally, it downloads information about the items
the user ﬁnds when browsing the recommender’s web site. This information
may include a description about the items, the ratings that other users assigned
to them, and the categories of interest these items belong to. In Amazon, for
instance, all this information is available to users. However, as commented on in
Sec. 3.1, this is not always the case. For this reason, our approach incorporates
modules intended to retrieve the population’s ratings and categorize all the items
that the user explores.
On the other hand, this module receives the ratings of unknown items sug-
gested by the forgery alarm generator and the ratings of known items sent by
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Fig. 2. Block diagram of the proposed architecture
the suppression alarm generator. Afterwards, the module submits these ratings
to the recommendation system.
Category Extractor. This component is responsible for obtaining the cate-
gories the items belong to. To this end, the module uses the information provided
by the communication manager. Should this information not be enough, the mo-
dule will have to get additional data by searching the Web or by querying an
information provider. Afterwards, the categorization of these items is carried out
by using the vector space model and the TF-IDF weights as commented on in
Sec. 3.1. In a last stage, this module sends the items and their corresponding
categories to the known/unknown items classiﬁer.
Known/Unknown Items Classifier. This module requires the active in-
volvement of the user. Namely, it shows the user the items categorized by the
category extractor module, and then asks the user to classify them as known
or unknown. Evidently, this module will have previously checked whether these
items have already been rated by the user. Should this be the case, the rated
items would not be shown to the user, since these items would be classiﬁed as
known items. For this purpose, the module keeps a record of all the items that
the user rates. Once these items have been classiﬁed as known or unknown,
they are sent to the forgery alarm generator and the suppression alarm genera-
tor, respectively. In addition, the known items are submitted to the user proﬁle
constructor.
User Profile Constructor. This module is responsible for the estimation of
the user proﬁle. To this end, the module is provided with the user’s known items,
i.e., those items capturing their preferences. Based on these items, it generates
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the user proﬁle as described in Sec. 3.1. Obviously, during this process, the
module discards those rated items that were already considered in the histogram
computation.
Forgery and Suppression Generator. This block is the centerpiece of the
architecture as it is directly responsible for the user privacy. First, the block is
provided with the user proﬁle. In addition, the user speciﬁes a forgery rate ρ
and a suppression rate σ. The former is the fraction of ratings of unknown items
that the user is willing to submit. The latter is the relative frequency of ratings
of known items that the user is disposed to eliminate. Having speciﬁed these
two rates, the module computes the optimum tuples of forgery r∗ and suppres-
sion s∗, which contain information about the ratings that should be forged and
suppressed, respectively. More accurately, the component ri is the percentage of
ratings of unknown items that our architecture suggests submitting in the cate-
gory i. The component si is deﬁned analogously for suppression. An example of
these tuples is represented in Fig. 3, where we suppose that the user agrees to
forge and eliminate ρ = 10% and σ = 15% of their ratings, respectively. Based
on these rates, the block calculates the optimal tuples r∗ and s∗. In this example,
the tuple s∗ indicates that the user should refrain from rating 10% of the items
belonging to the category 1 and 5% in the category 2. This is consistent with
the fact the actual user proﬁle is biased towards these categories.
In the end, these two tuples are sent to the forgery alarm generator and the
suppression alarm generator, respectively. Later in Sec. 4, we provide a more de-
tailed speciﬁcation of this module by using a formulation of the trade-oﬀ among
privacy, forgery rate and suppression rate, which will enable us to compute the
tuples r∗ and s∗.
Suppression Alarm Generator. This module is responsible for warning the
user when their privacy is being compromised. Concretely, this module receives
the tuple s∗ and stores the known items provided by the known/unknown items
classiﬁer. These items are stored in an array. When the user decides to assign a
rating to one of these items, the selected item is removed from the array. The
user then rates this item, and the module proceeds as follows: if s∗ has a positive
component in at least one of the categories the item belongs to, a privacy alarm
is generated to alert the user, and it is then for the user to decide whether
to eliminate the rating or not. However, if s∗ is zero for all components, our
architecture does not become aware of any privacy risk and the rating is sent to
the communication manager module. This process is repeated provided that the
array is not empty.
In order to illustrate how this block works, suppose that it receives the tuples
of forgery and suppression shown in Fig. 3. According to these tuples, the block
would trigger an alarm if the user decided to rate an item classiﬁed into the
categories 1 or 2. On the contrary, if the user wanted to rate an item belonging
to any of the other categories, the system would forward this rating to the
recommender.
Forgery Alarm Generator. Our approach also relies on the forgery of rat-
ings. Precisely, this module selects, on the one hand, which unknown items should
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Based on the user proﬁle and the rates of forgery and suppression, our architecture
computes the optimal tuples r∗ and s∗. On the one hand, the tuple r∗ gives us the
percentage of unknown items that the user should rate in each category. And on the
other hand, s∗ provides the user with the proportion of known items that they should
eliminate in each category.
be rated, and on the other hand, which particular ratings should be assigned to
these unknown items. With regard to the ratings to be given to the items, we
follow a method similar to the one pointed out in [20]. Namely, our approach
assigns each unknown item a random rating, drawn according to the distribution
of the other users’ ratings to that item. Alternatively, we could also contemplate
the distribution of ratings of a user with similar preferences, and the distribution
of all ratings. In order to obtain this information, the module will have to query
information providers or explore other recommenders. In the case of Amazon,
for example, this is not necessary since users are provided with the population’s
ratings.
In parallel, the module receives unknown items and stores them in an array.
After getting the tuple r∗, the module proceeds as follows: if r∗ has positive
components in one or several categories, a privacy alarm is triggered. Our ar-
chitecture encourages then the user to submit a random rating to one of the
unknown items in the array which belong to these categories. This is case shown
in Fig. 3, where our approach recommends that the user rate items belonging to
the categories 5, 6 and 7, which are those categories the user is not especially
interested in. However, it is the user who ﬁnally decides whether to send this
rating or not. If the user accepts the recommendation, then the rating is sent to
the communication manager module, and the unknown item is removed from the
array. This whole process is repeated provided that r∗ has at least one positive
component.
After having explored each of the modules of the architecture, next we shall
describe how our approach would work. Initially, the user would browse the rec-
ommendation system’s web site and would ﬁnd some items. In order for the user
to obtain future recommendations from the system, they would have to rate
some of those items. Before proceeding, though, our approach would retrieve
information about the items and extract the categories they belong to. After-
wards, the user would be asked to classify the items as known or unknown. The
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known items would allow the proposed architecture to build the user proﬁle.
After computing the tuples r∗ and s∗, our approach could suggest submitting a
random rating to one or more of the unknown items. Should this be the case,
the user would have to decide whether to send the rating or not. Next, the user
would start rating the known items. At a certain point, the user could receive a
privacy alarm when trying to rate one of these items. Should this be the case, it
would be up to the user to decide whether to eliminate the rating or not.
4 Formulation of the Trade-Oﬀ among Privacy, Forgery
Rate and Suppression Rate
In this section, we present a formulation of the optimal trade-oﬀ among privacy,
forgery rate and suppression rate. In the absence of a thorough study, our formu-
lation considers these two rates as a measure of the degradation in the accuracy
of the recommendations. This simpliﬁcation allows us to formulate the problem
of choosing a forgery tuple and a suppression tuple as a multiobjective optimiza-
tion problem that takes into account privacy, forgery rate and suppression rate.
As we shall show later, this formulation will enable us to go into the details of
one of the functional blocks of the proposed architecture.
Next, we formalize some of the concepts that we introduced in previous sec-
tions. Speciﬁcally, we model the items in a recommendation system as r.v.’s tak-
ing on values in a common ﬁnite alphabet of categories, namely the set {1, . . . , n}
for some n ∈ Z+. Accordingly, we deﬁne q as the probability distribution of the
known items of a particular user, that is, the distribution capturing the actual
preferences of the user. In line with Sec. 3.4, we introduce a rating forgery rate
ρ ∈ [0, 1), which is the ratio of forged items. Analogously, we deﬁne a rating sup-
pression rate σ ∈ [0, 1), modeling the proportion of items that the user consents
to eliminate. Bearing this in mind, we deﬁne the user’s apparent item distribu-
tion t as q+r−s1+ρ−σ for some forgery strategy r = (r1, . . . , rn) and some suppression
strategy s = (s1, . . . , sn), satisfying, on the one hand, ri  0 and
∑
ri = ρ for
i = 1, . . . , n, and on the other hand, qi  si  0 and
∑
si = σ for i = 1, . . . , n.
In light of this deﬁnition, the user’s apparent item distribution may be inter-
preted as the result of the suppression of some genuine ratings from the actual
user proﬁle and the posterior addition of some forged ratings. Afterwards, this
is normalized by 11+ρ−σ so that
∑
i ti = 1.
According to the justiﬁcation provided in Sec. 3.3, we use Shannon’s entropy
to quantify user privacy. More precisely, we measure privacy as the entropy of
the user’s apparent item distribution. Consistently with this measure, we deﬁne
the privacy-forgery-suppression function
P(ρ, σ) = max
r,s
ri0,
∑
ri=ρ
qisi0,
∑
si=σ
H
(
q + r − s
1 + ρ− σ
)
, (1)
which characterizes the optimal trade-oﬀ among privacy, forgery rate and sup-
pression rate, and enables us to specify the module forgery and suppression
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generator in Sec. 3.4. More accurately, this functional block will be in charge
of solving the optimization problem in (1). Last but not least, we would like to
remark that this optimization problem is convex [42], which in practice means
that there are powerful and eﬃcient numerical methods to solve it.
5 Numerical Example
This section provides a simple yet insightful numerical example that illustrates
the formulation in Sec. 4 and sheds some light into the beneﬁts from combining
the forgery and suppression of ratings.
In this example, we assume two user’s proﬁles q1 = (0.05, 0.35, 0.60) and q2 =
(0.15, 0.15, 0.70), across three categories of interest. We deﬁne the user’s critical
privacy region as the set {(ρ, σ) : P(ρ, σ) = H(u)}, and the critical forgery rate
ρcrit as min{ρ : P(ρ, 0) = H(u)}. Analogously, we deﬁne the critical suppression
rate σcrit. Fig. 4 shows the critical privacy region and the critical rates for these
two users. In addition, we depicted several contour lines of function (1).
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Fig. 4. We represent the critical privacy region and several contour lines of the privacy-
forgery-suppression function, for two users with actual proﬁles q1 and q2
One important observation that emerges from these ﬁgures is that the com-
bined use of forgery and suppression may be more eﬀective than the sole appli-
cation of one of these techniques. To illustrate this, consider the cost τ = ρ+ σ,
where the impact of forgery and suppression is balanced. According to this, we
deﬁne the critical cost τcrit as min{τ : P(ρ, σ) = H(u), τ = ρ + σ}. Now we con-
template two possible strategies for the user: the mixed strategy, where forgery
and suppression are used in conjunction, and the pure strategy, consisting in
the application of one of these two mechanisms. In Fig. 4(a), we can appreciate
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a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between these two strategies. Namely, when the user is
not willing to eliminate any of their ratings, τcrit|σ=0 = ρcrit  0.78. Similarly,
when forgery is not applied, τcrit|ρ=0 = σcrit  0.85. However, when the user
adopts the mixed strategy, it turns out that τcrit  0.55. Unfortunately, this is
not always the case. For example, in Fig. 4(b) we ﬁnd that τcrit = σcrit, i.e.,
the pure strategy leads to the minimum cost. In a nutshell, the combination of
forgery and suppression may result in a synergy that can help users protect their
privacy more eﬃciently.
6 Concluding Remarks
There exist numerous proposals for the protection of user privacy in CF-based
recommendation systems. Within these approaches, the forgery and suppression
of ratings arise as two simple mechanisms in terms of infrastructure require-
ments, as users need not trust the recommender. However, the application of
these mechanisms comes at the cost of some processing overhead and, more
importantly, at the expense of a degradation in the accuracy of the recommen-
dations.
Our main contribution is an architecture that implements the forgery and
suppression of ratings in those recommendation systems that proﬁle users exclu-
sively from their ratings. We describe the functionality of the internal modules
of this architecture. The centerpiece of our approach is a module responsible for
computing a pair of tuples containing information about which ratings should
be forged and which ones should be eliminated. Our architecture uses then this
information to warn the user when their privacy is being compromised. The
user is who ﬁnally decides whether to follow the recommendations made by our
approach or not.
We present a mathematical formulation of the optimal trade-oﬀ among pri-
vacy, forgery rate and suppression rate, which arises from the deﬁnition of our
privacy criterion. This formulation allows us to specify the module responsi-
ble for user privacy. Lastly, we illustrate the formulation with a simple albeit
insightful numerical example.
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